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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PHILLIP EDWARD MILLER, : 
APPELLEE'S RESPONSIVE 
Petitioner/Appellant/ : BRIEF/ CROSS-APPELLANTS 
Cross-Appellee, OPENING BRIEF 
vs. 
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, Bureau 
Chief, Driver License Services, State of : Case No. 20010306-CA 
Utah, (Lower Docket 00090213 8) 
Priority No. 15 
Respondent/Appellee/ 
Cross-Appellant. 
Respondent/Appellee/Cross-Appellant G. Barton Blackstock (hereafter Driver 
License Division) cross-appeals from the lower court's final order, following a trial de 
novo, which shortened the Driver License Division's one year revocation of Petitioner/ 
Appellant/Cross Appellee's (hereafter Miller) driver's license by sixty days to remedy 
Miller for the violation which occurred to his due process and statutory rights. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Driver License Division appeals from the District Court's final order entered 
February 22, 2001, following a trial de novo . The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in 
this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(b)(i), (1996) 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue #1: Did the District Court err in ruling that it is a violation of due process where 
there has been notice and a hearing, but a failure to provide a temporary driver's license 
prior to the hearing as mandated by statute? This issue was preserved in the trial court 
counsels argument, and by the judge's final order ruling that there was a violation to 
Miller's due process and statutory rights. (See Addendum A at 5 and Addendum B at 21, 
22, and 29-30.) 
Standard of Review: The standard of review is the "correction of error" standard. See 
Brinkerfoff v. Schwendiman. 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Ut. App. 1990). 
Issue # 2: Did the District Court err when it modified the Driver License Division's 
order revoking Miller's license by reducing the one year suspension by sixty days as a 
remedy for the due process and statutory violation? This issue was preserved in the trial 
court by the judge's final order in which he sua sponte fashioned his own remedy. (See 
Addendum A at 5 and Addendum B at 29-30.) 
Standard of Review: The standard of review is the "correction of error" standard. See 
Brinkerfoff v. Schwendiman. 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Ut. App. 1990). 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes and constitutional provision will be determinative of the 
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issue on appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (2) (Supp. 2000) 
(2)(a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then been 
requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical 
tests under Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to any chemical test 
requested, the person shall be warned by the peace officer requesting the 
test or tests that a refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in 
revocation of the person's license to operate a motor vehicle. 
(b) Following the warning under Subsection (2)(a), if the person 
does not immediately request that the chemical test or tests as offered by a 
peace officer be administered a peace officer shall serve on the person, on 
behalf of the Driver License Division, immediate notice of the Driver 
License Division's intention to revoke the person's privilege of license to 
operate a motor vehicle. When the officer served the immediate notice on 
behalf of the Driver License Division, he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of 
the operator. 
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 29 days: and 
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the Driver 
License Division, basic information regarding how to obtain a 
hearing before the Driver License Division.... 
United States Constitution, Amendment 14 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 21, 2000, Officer K. Olsen of the West Valley City Police Department 
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arrested Miller for driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44. (Addendum A at 2). Miller was served notice of the Division's intent to 
suspend or revoke his driving privilege, which included information on how to receive a 
hearing. (Addendum A at 2). On February 15, 2000, Miller received an informal 
administrative hearing before the Driver License Division. (Addendum A at 2). After 
that hearing the Driver License Division revoked Miller's driving privilege for a period of 
1 year, effective February 15, 2000, because it found that Miller knowingly refused to take 
the requested chemical tests. (Addendum A at 2). Miller appealed the Driver License 
Division's suspension order to the District Court. On December 21, 2000, pursuant to the 
appeal, there was a trial de novo in District Court before the Honorable Ronald E. 
Nehring. (Addendum B). 
At the trial de novo, counsel stipulated that Officer Olsen had reasonable cause to 
believe that Miller was driving in violation of section 41-6-44, and that he knowingly 
refused the requested chemical tests. (See Addendum A at 1 and B at 2 and 3). The only 
issue before the court was whether a failure by the arresting officer to give Miller a 
temporary license, from January 21, the date of Miller's arrest until February 15, the date 
of the revocation hearing, as required by statute was a violation of his due process and 
statutory rights and, if so, what was the remedy. (Addendum A and B). At the trial, 
arguments were heard and the court determined that the failure to provide a temporary 
license was a due process as well as a statutory violation. (Addendum A at 5). The court 
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then fashioned its own remedy and reduced the one-year revocation by sixty (60) days. 
(Addendum A at 5). 
A final written order was entered and signed by the court on February 22, 2001. 
(Addendum A at 5). A notice of Appeal was filed by Miller on March 9, 2001. A notice 
of Cross Appeal was filed by Driver License Division on March 26, 2001. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 21, 2000, Officer K. Olsen of the West Valley City Police Department 
Miller, for driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of section 41-6-44. 
(Addendum A at 2). Miller was then transported the West Valley City Police 
Department and was read the chemical test admonitions verbatim from the D.U.I. Report 
Form. (Addendum A at 2). Miller was asked to submit to a breath test. (Addendum A at 
2). Miller refused to submit to the requested chemical test. (Addendum A at 2). Officer 
Olsen read Miller the refusal admonition verbatim off of the D.U.I, report form. Miller 
refused to submit to the requested breath test. (Addendum A at 2). 
Officer Olsen took away Miller's driver's license. (Addendum A at 2). Acting as 
an agent for the Driver License Division, he served Miller with a copy of the D.U.I. 
Summons and Citation which included notice of the Driver License Division's intent to 
suspend or revoke Miller's license. (Addendum A at 2). The notice has a box that allows 
the form to be a valid temporary driver's license for up to twenty- nine days from the date 
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the form was given. (Addendum A, Exhibit 1). After confiscating Miller's driver's 
license, Officer Olsen incorrectly checked the box on the form which indicates that the 
form was "NOT VALID" as a temporary license because Miller refused the chemical test. 
(Addendum A at 3). 
Pursuant to the notice, Miller requested a hearing with the Driver License Division 
and a hearing was held on February 15, 2000. (Addendum A at 2). As a result of the 
hearing, Petitioner's driving privileges were revoked for one year for his refusal to submit 
to a chemical test after his arrest for Driving Under the Influence. (Addendum A at 2). 
The trial court concluded that the action by the officer of incorrectly checking the "not 
valid" box violated section 41-6-44.10(2)(b), and violated Miller's due process rights. 
(Addendum A at 3). The court then fashioned a remedy and reduced the year revocation 
by sixty (60) days. (Addendum A at 5). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court incorrectly ruled that the failure of the arresting officer to give 
Appellant a temporary license in violation of a state statute, rises to the level of 
constitutional due process violation. Due Process does not require a pre-suspension 
hearing where the revocation is based on a driving under the influence arrest or a habitual 
offender statute and a quick post-suspension hearing is available. See Dixon v. Love, 45 
U. S. 105 (1977); Mackev v. Montrvm. 443 U.S. 1 (1979). The United States Supreme 
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Court distinguished the above cases from Bell v. Burson. 402 U.S. 535 (1971), in which 
it held that for an uninsured motorist, due process requires a pre-suspension hearing on 
the issue of liability. 
The District Court erred when it fashioned its own remedy for the statutory 
violation which did not have any relationship to the harm done by the violation. The 
remedy for the statutory violation should be that which makes Miller whole, i.e., a 
reduction of the one-year suspension by the twenty four days in which he should have had 
a temporary licence prior to the revocation hearing and revocation of his license. Miller's 
argument, in his opening brief, that the statutory violation is fatal to the revocation 
process lacks merit. Even though Miller was not given a mandated temporary license, 
Miller was served with notice of Driver License division's intent to suspend or revoke his 
license according to both due process and statutory requirements. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT A 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. $ 41-6-44.10 ARISES TO 
A LEVEL OF A DUE PROCESS VIOLATION. 
The trial court ruled that the failure of the arresting officer to give Miller a 
temporary license pending the administrative hearing in violation of Section § 41-6-
44.10(2)(b)(ii) was not only a statutory violation, but also a due process violation. The 
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law is well settled that a revocation of a driver's license involves State action that 
adjudicates important interests of the licensees, and as such, licenses are not to be revoked 
without the procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Bell, 402 
U.S. at 539. However, the trial court erred when it relied on Bell in ruling that a failure 
by the arresting officer to give Miller a temporary license in violation of Section 41-6-
44.10, is also a due process violation. 
In BeU, the Supreme Court determined that a Georgia motor vehicle safety 
responsibility statute covering uninsured motorists was unconstitutional for violating the 
petitioner's due process rights by failing to give him a pre-suspension hearing on liability. 
Id. at 543. The purpose of the hearing mandated by Bell is to provide the opportunity for 
a licensed driver to demonstrate that he/she is free from fault before a decision is made to 
revoke his license. The Supreme Court distinguished their ruling in Bell from cases 
where the revocation is pursuant to a Driving Under the Influence (hereinafter DUI) arrest 
and where the revocation is based on habitual vehicle code violations. See Mackey v. 
Montrvm. 443 U.S. 1, 30 (1979); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 114-115 (1977). This 
instant case presents issues similar to those addressed in both Montrym and Love. 
In Montrviru the Supreme Court held that a Massachusetts statute mandating 
suspension of a driver's license for refusal to take a breath test upon arrest for driving 
while intoxicated, without a pre-suspension hearing, did not violate due process. 
Montrviru 443 U.S. at 19. The Massachusetts statute provided for an immediate post-
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suspension hearing and provided for an appeal. Id. at 7. The court concluded in 
Montrym, "that the compelling interest in highway safety justifies the commonwealth in 
making a summary suspension effective pending the outcome of the prompt post-
suspension hearing. Id. at 19. 
In Love, the Supreme Court ruled that an Illinois habitual offender statute which 
provided for a post-suspension hearing within 20 days of a written request from a 
licensee, but no pre-suspension hearing, was not in violation of due process. Dixon, 45 
U. S. at 112. The Supreme Court considered that a "licensee in Illinois eventually can 
obtain all the safeguards procedural due process could be thought to require before a 
discretionary suspension or revocation becomes final." Id. (emphasis added). The court 
concluded that "the public interests present under the circumstances of this case are 
sufficiently visible and weighty for the state to make its summary initial decision 
effective without a pre-decision administrative hearing. Id. 
Here, Miller was arrested for driving under the influence and refused to take a 
breath test. By statute, Miller should have been given a temporary license by the 
arresting officer, which would have enabled him to drive the twenty-five days until the 
revocation hearing. However, this was not done by the arresting officer and Miller was 
not able to drive with a license prior to the hearing. However, it was only after the 
revocation hearing that the Driver License Division order Miller's license revoked for a 
period of one year. The revocation of Miller's license became final only after he had the 
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revocation hearing. Miller then appealed that final order to the District Court. 
This case is, in effect, no different than Montrym or Love . Here, Miller license 
was taken from him, in error, prior to his revocation hearing. The statutes addressed in 
Montrym and Love allowed for summary suspension prior to any hearing. In Montrym, 
Massachusetts allowed for an immediate post-suspension hearing. Montrym, 443 U.S. at 
7 . In Love, Illinois provided for a hearing within 20 days of a written request from the 
licensee. Love, 45 U.S. at 112. Here, as in Montrym and Love, Miller was given all the 
procedural safeguards due process requires before the revocation of his license became 
final. The trial court erred in determining that a statutory error on the part of the arresting 
officer rose to the level of a due process violation. 
POINT II. 
TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY REDUCED THE REVOCATION 
PERIOD BY SIXTY DAYS AS A REMEDY FOR THE STATUTORY 
VIOLATION. 
After it ruled that there was a due process and statutory violation, the trial court 
fashioned its own remedy by arbitrarily deducting 60 days off of the one-year revocation 
of Miller's license ordered by the Driver License Division. The court's remedy has no 
relationship to the statutory violation. There should be some relationship between the 
violation found and the remedy. The only harm done to Miller as a result of the failure to 
be provided a temporary license prior to the administrative hearing was that he was 
10 
deprived of his license an extra thirty days, until the Driver License Division made its 
final order revoking Miller's license. 
A more appropriate remedy for the statutory violation is to have the year 
revocation be effective January 21, 2000, Miller's arrest date and the date Miller's license 
was taken from him by the arresting officer, instead of February 15, 2001, the date of the 
Driver License Division's revocation order. As such, Miller would only have his license 
suspended for a total of one-year as required by statute. Utah Code Ann. §41-6-
44.10(2)(i)(1999)(amended 2000). 
Miller argues in his opening brief that the due process and statutory violation 
found by the trial court is fatal to the revocation process. In support of that argument 
Miller relies on the court of appeals case of Mabus v. Blackstock, 994 P.2d 1272 (Ut. 
App. 1999). However, the reliance on Mabus is misplaced. In Mabus, this court 
addressed the issues of what is the initiatory event of the Driver License Division's 
revocation process and what bestows jurisdiction upon the Driver License Division to 
suspend or revoke an individual's driving privilege? Id. In deciding those issues, this 
court looked to and interpreted section 41-6-44.10 (2)(b), which requires service of notice 
of the Driver License Division's intent to suspend or revoke. This court held that the 
service of notice of the Driver License Division's intent to suspend or revoke is the 
initiatory event that bestows jurisdiction upon the Driver License Division to suspend or 
revoke an individual's license. Id at 1275. As such, this court held that a failure to 
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personally serve such notice or failure to present evidence at the trial de novo that notice 
was personally served is fatal to the revocation process. Id. This court's ruling in Mabus 
should not be extended to treat any violation of section 41-6-44.10 (2) as fatal to the 
revocation process. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Driver License Division respectfully requests that 
this court (1) reverse the lower court's ruling that a failure to comply with Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44.10 2(b)(ii) is a due process violation and (2) modify the remedy the lower 
court fashioned after correctly finding a statutory violation. The Driver License Division 
asks this court to rule that the statutory violation did not rise to the level of a due process 
violation and that the appropriate remedy for the statutory violation is to make the year 
revocation effective the date Miller was arrested for driving under the influence and had 
his license taken by the arresting officer. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Day of July 2001 
'REBECCA D. WALDRON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Driver License Division 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I Rebecca D. Waldron, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand delivered an 
original and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 
Fifth floor, 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 and two copies by First Class Mail 
to Benjamin A. Hamilton, Attorney for Appellant, at 356 East 900 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111. 
/Rebecca D. Waldron 
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ADDENDUM A 
DISTRICT COURT ORDER 
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F B 2 2 200\ 
Benjamin A Hamilton (s6238) 
Attorney for Defendant 
356 East 900 South 
Salt Lake Cit\, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801)322-3622 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PHILLIP EDWARD MILLER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, 
Director, Utah State Driver 
License Division, 
Respondent 
) 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 000902138 
Judge RONALD E. NEHRJNG 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for a trial cte novo on December 21, 
2000, the Honorable Ronald E Nehring presiding The Petitioner and his counsel, Benjamin A 
Hamilton appeared and the Respondent appeared through counsel Rebecca D Waldron, Assistant 
Attorney General Prior to the start of the hearing, the Petitioner agreed and stipulated that the 
elements required to be proven by Respondent in regards to the Petitioner's arrest for violation of 
Utah Code Ann § 41-6-44, and the reading of the chemical test admonitions to the Petitioner, and 
the establishing of the knowing refusal were and are met The Petitioner only challenges the 
confiscation of his driver's license and privilege by the Respondent through the arresting officer 
prior to affording the Petitioner with a hearing 
The court, having heard and considered the evidence and arguments stipulated to and 
presented at the hearing, being fully advised in the premises, makes the following Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Order 
FINDING OF FACTS 
1 On January 21, 2000, the Petitioner, PHILLIP EDWARD MILLER, (hereinafter the 
"Petitioner") was arrested for Driving Under the Influence in violation of Utah Code Ann 
§ 41-6-44, by Officer K Olsen of the West Valley City Police Department 
2 After the an est, the Petitioner was transported to the West Valley City Police Department 
and was read the chemical test admonitions verbatim from the DUI Report Form The 
Petitioner was requested to submit to a chemical test to measure the alcohol content of his 
breath Officer Olsen, acting in behalf of the Respondent, read The Petitioner the refusal 
admonition and the Petitioner refused to submit to the chemical test 
3. The arresting officer seized the Petitioner's driver's license and, acting as an ayent of the 
Respondent, personally served the Petitioner a form,1 approved by the Respondent, that 
notified the Petitioner of his right to a hearing for his driving privileges if requested within 
ten (10) days of his arrest 
4. Pursuant to the notice, the Petitioner requested a hearing with the Driver License Division 
and the hearing was held on February 15, 2000 As a result of the hearing, the Petitioner's 
driving privileges were revoked for one (1) year for his refusal to submit to a chemical test 
after an arrest for Driving Under the Influence 
5. The above mentioned form (Exhibit 1) has boxes at the bottom where the officer, acting 
as an agent of the respondent can mark a box indicating that the form is either "VALID" 
or "NOT VALID" as a driver's license for up to thirty (30) days 
:
 Petitioner's Exhibit 1 
2 
6 After confiscating the Petitioner's driver's license, Officer Olsen checked the box on the 
form indicating that the form was "NOT VALID" as a temporary license The reason 
stated by the officer for not issuing a temporary license was the Petitioner's refusal to take 
the requested breath test 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Section 41-6-44 10 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) requires that when a person 
refuses to submit to a chemical test after an arrest for Driving Under the Influence, the arresting 
officer 
. shall serve on the person, on behalf of the Driver License Division, immediate notice 
of the Driver License Divisions intention to revoke the person's privilege or license to 
operate a motor vehicle When the officer serves the immediate notice on behalf of the 
Driver License Division, he shall 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator; 
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 29 days, and 
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the Driver License Division, basic 
information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the Driver License Division 
Utah Code Ann § 41-6-44 10(2)(b) (1953 as amended)(emphasis added) 
The officer, acting on behalf of the Respondent in this case, seized the Petitioner's license 
and failed to issue a temporary license to the Petitioner The deprivation of the Petitioner's 
license violated his statutory and due process rights The Petitioner was advised of his right to a 
hearing to challenge the propriety of the deprivation of his driving privilege The Petitioner 
exercised that right The hearing was held and the Respondent revoked the Petitioner's driving 
privilege for one year The integrity of the hearing was not compromised by the unlawful 
suspension of the Petitioner's driving privilege between the arrest of the Petitioner and the 
hearing 
This court concludes that the nature of the problem presented here is not a systemic 
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problem in law enforcement but is rather a problem of an isolated nature and one occurring onlv 
from time to time infrequently. Therefore, it is this court's responsibility to fashion an 
appropriate remedy for the violations to the Petitioner's statutory and due process rigths The 
court has considerable discretion in fashioning a remedy to this type of due process violation The 
Petitioner argues that the United States Supreme Court, in Bell v Burson. 402 U S 535, 91 S Ct 
1586 (1971), held that due process requires notice and a hearing before there can be a deprivation 
of the interest here involved 
The precise question presented in this case is - where there has been notice and a hearing, 
but prior to the hearing there has been an unlawful deprivation of an important interest - does the 
unlawful deprivation of one's driving interest restrict the Driver License Division from taking any 
fuaher authority to effect a deprivation9 Or rather, is the Respondent in this case precluded from 
revoking the Petitioner's license based on the previous violation of the Petitioner's statutory and 
due process rights9 The answer is no. The Respondent may properly proceed with the process 
which might result in the further deprivation of the Petitioner's rights The Respondent's actions, 
however, are subject to the fashioning of a remedy by the District Court 
The court hereby concludes that the revocation of the Petitioner's driving privilege was 
appropriate The court also finds that, given the facts and circumstances of this case, the 
Petitioner's driving privilege should be reinstated by the Respondent Sixty (60) days prior to the 
One (1) year revocation previously ordered by the Respondent 
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ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the revocation of the Petitioner's driving privilege be 
upheld with the modification that the revocation be for a period of One (1) year, less Sixty (60) 
days to remedy the Petitioner for the violation which occurred to his statutors' and due process 
rights. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the revocation be stayed pending an appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals of this Order. 
Dated this Zt*> , day of February, 2001. 
Approvers to form: 
REBECCA D WALDRON 
Attorney for Respondent 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of February, 2000, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order was mailed to the followinu: 
Rebecca Waldron 
Assistant Attorney General 
P.O. Box 140857' 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-1S57 
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above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that 
the following videotape proceedings were had. 
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A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff: BENJAMIN A. HAMILTON 
Attorney at Law 
356 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
For the Defendant: REBECCA D. WALDRON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
160 East 300 South 
Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: L e t ' s s e e , did I t ake t h a t f i l e o r d id 
you? 
( I n a u d i b l e ) 
THE COURT: Let's turn to Miller versus Elackstock, 
000902138. 
Counsel, would you please state your appearances? 
MS. WALDRON: Rebecca Waldron for the respondent. 
MR. HAMILTON: Ben Hamilton for the petitioner, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: It looks like Mr. Hamilton just handed 
Ms. Waldron the same case that Mr. Hamilton just gave to me 
and I — 
MR. HAMILTON: What I just handed her was, she 
asked to see a copy of the code. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. I haven't read— 
MS. WALDRON: But he previously just handed me a 
copy of the same case he just handed you. 
THE COURT: That I haven't read. 
MR. HAMILTON: Would you like to take a recess 
before we begin this? We've narrowed the issues 
significantly and instead of looking at probable cause and 
having to put on the witness to establish that the officer 
had sufficient probable cause to make the arrest and perform 
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the field sobriety tests, we're foregoing that and focusing 
instead on just the one issue. 
And if the Court would like to hear the issue and 
then take a recess to read that case, (inaudible) 
THE COURT: I'm going to accept that invitation. 
Yeah, I'd like to have you kinda give me some context of the 
case, then I'll read it and then I may come back and pick it 
up again. 
MR. HAMILTON: Sure. 
THE COURT: Are you comfortable with this, Ms. 
Waldron? 
MS. WALDRON: Yeah, I am. My—I'm fine. We had 
talked—okay. We had talked about it and this is continuing, 
we had talked about it, you know, about three months ago 
(inaudible) but the issue is, is usually on these notices, 
the officer will check the license—that piece of paper is 
valid for a period of 30 days until the hearing. It didn't 
happen in this case and the issue is, is that (inaudible) the 
Driver's License ability to suspend or revoke the license. 
And I'm right now looking at 41-4-6-44.10. I 
wonder—you wouldn't happen to have the 53-3 Section, would 
you? 
THE COURT: What section should I be looking at? 
MR. HAMILTON: The relevant section here, your 
Honor, is—Mr. Miller's driver's license was suspended under 
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41-6-44,10. And— 
MS* WALDRON: There's two—there's two code 
sections. That one, and then the 53-3-223. 
MR. HAMILTON: And the Title 53 section deals with 
suspension of driver's licenses on what's called per se 
suspension, based on the probable cause to have arrested the 
individual in the first place for DUI. And— 
MS. WALDRON: There should be a similar one under 
the refusal. 
MR. HAMILTON: And Title 41, the section under 
Title 41 deals with whether the individual refused to blow in 
the machine and the suspension based on that and that's the 
issue before the Court today because that's what Mr. Miller's 
license was suspended on. 
If you'll notice, in the citation— 
THE COURT: Well, let me make sure I understand. 
So, your contention is that Title 53 isn't relevant 'cause 
we're not fighting the battle over probable cause? 
MR. HAMILTON: Right. But it's virtually identical 
in terms of what the officer's duties are. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. HAMILTON: So, it really doesn't matter which 
one we go off because the language is identical, but I think 
we should be focusing on the proper section— 
THE COURT: Which is the 41-6-44. 
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MR. HAMILTON: 44.10, that's right. 
THE COURT: 44.10. 
MR. HAMILTON: And—and last—and we—and the 
petitioner would move at this point to have admitted as 
evidence Petitioner's Exhibit 1, which is a copy of the 
citation and form published by the Driver's License Division 
that is required to be handed to my client and served before 
any suspension can be done. 
And you'll notice that the— 
THE COURT: Well, just a second. 
Ms. Waldron— 
MS. WALDRON: Yes. 
THE COURT: —any objection to Exhibit 1? 
MS. WALDRON: No objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Exhibit l's received. 
MR. HAMILTON: You'll notice at the bottom of that 
form, it gives the officer the opportunity to check one of 
two boxes, one box saying, this is valid and the other 
saying, not valid; has a temporary license for up to 30 days 
from the date of this notice. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. HAMILTON: The officer checked that this is not 
a valid license and I think we can stipulate that the officer 
confiscated the Utah license from Mr. Miller; is that fair to 
say? 
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MR. MILLER: Yes. 
MR. HAMILTON: Sof I believe we have a stipulation 
from the Driver's License Division at this point, that Mr. 
Miller's license was taken, his physical license, the 
certificate. He was issued instead this driver—this 
citation, which is also—should be a permit, assuming he had 
a valid driver's license and that, we would also ask for a 
stipulation. 
THE COURT: All right. So, let me make sure I 
understand, Mr. Hamilton. 
The valid/not valid option is present to cover 
those circumstances in which the person cited does not have a 
valid operator's license at the time of the arrest? 
MR. HAMILTON: That's correct. 
THE COURT: So that there isn't a de facto grant of 
a—of a temporary license to someone who didn't have one in 
the first place; is that— 
MR. HAMILTON: Yes. So, the officer, on—acting— 
acting on behalf of the Driver's License Division isn't 
taking authority that he doesn't have— 
THE COURT: That he doesn't have. 
MR. HAMILTON: —to give somebody a license when 
they don't have one in the first place. 
THE COURT: So, the arresting officer makes an 
initial determination as to the validity of the driver's 
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license status and based on that determination, checks one 
box or the other; is that correct? 
MR. HAMILTON: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HAMILTON: And that was in fact done here, but 
instead of checking that this is a valid license, temporary 
license, the officer checked that this is not a valid 
temporary license for up to 30 days. 
The statute—the reason for the 30-day limitation 
is because the statute, in meeting due process grounds, has 
set forth that the hearing must occur on whether they're 
going to revoke or suspend this individual's license within 
the 30-day period. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. HAMILTON: And so—so we're not taking away the 
individual's driving privileges without affording him the due 
process of having notice and right to a hearing— 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. HAMILTON: —it's required that the person be 
granted this temporary driving privilege. 
THE COURT: Got it. 
MR. HAMILTON: The—the officer checked for his 
reason for not issuing a temporary license, at the bottom of 
the citation, was the refusal of the test. 
In the refusal statute, which is the 41-6-44.10 
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1 statute, under Subsection (2)(b)—these are the requirements 
2 (that the officer is supposed to meet. Following one, under 
3 Subsection (a), if the person does not immediately request 
4 that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer 
5 be administered, a peace officer shall serve on the person on 
6 behalf of the Driver's License Division immediate notice of 
7 the Driver's License Division's intention to revoke the 
8 person's privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle, 
9 Now, that was done. On behalf of the Driver's 
10 License Division, the officer submitted to Mr. Miller this 
11 citation, which is the notice approved of by the Driver's 
12 License Division and at the bottom, where it—in bold type, 
13 in small type but in bold type, it affords Mr. MilLer the 
14 notice of his right to a hearing. 
15 THE COURT: Uh huh. 
16 MR. HAMILTON: So that was complied with. 
17 When the officer serves the immediate notice on 
18 behalf of the Driver's License Division, he shall do the 
19 following: 
20 (1) Take the Utah license, certificate or permit, 
21 if any, of the operator—which was done; 
22 (2) Issue a temporary license effective for only 
23 29 days, which was not done and that's our contention; and 
24 (3) Supply the operator on a form approved by the 
25 Driver's License Division basic information regarding how to 
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request a hearing, which was done; and a citation issued by 
peace officer may, if approved as to form by the Driver's 
License Division, serve as a temporary license and that is 
what was provided. This form, which the Court has before it 
as Petitioner's Exhibit 1, is the form approved and the 
officer violated 41-6-41.10, Subsection (2)(b)(ii). 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, I'm going to ask you what 
you are going to anticipate from me as the obvious question. 
I assume that I entered a stay here? 
MR. HAMILTON: You did. 
THE COURT: Okay. And so Mr. Miller's driving 
privileges have been intact to today? 
MR. HAMILTON: That's not correct. 
THE COURT: That's not correct? 
MR. HAMILTON: No. 
MS. WALDRON: I think he has— 
MR. HAMILTON: (Inaudible) is— 
MS. WALDRON: I—I—I was counting it up. He was 
arrested on January 22nd, something like that, and the stay 
was granted on March something; so if it was suspended, it— 
if you count the— 
MR. HAMILTON: (Inaudible) arrest until we got it 
through 
him— 
the Dr 
THE 
'iver's 
COURT: 
License 
Yeah. 
hearing 
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which was--ruled against 
MR. HAMILTON: So, he didn't have a license from 
the time he got arrested through the hearing at the Driver's 
License Division, which he was supposed to have through tnat 
time period and then when they took action to take away his 
license and revoked his driving privileges for a year, we 
appealed it. It continued to be lost until the State, or the 
Driver's License Division requested a continuance— 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. WALDRON: Well, actually, I think— 
MR. HAMILTON: —at that time— 
MS. WALDRON: I'm looking at the file. 
THE COURT: Well, but the— 
MS. WALDRON: The stay was signed on March 22nd. 
THE COURT: Why don't we—why isn't all this moot 
except for whatever deprivation of Mr. Miller's rights might 
be proven occurred during that interval of time between the 
arrest and the administrative hearing? 
MS. WALDRON: See, that's our argument is that 
whatever, you know, they had the—the hearing was basically a 
post-deprivation hearing and it was determined at that point 
that there was enough—that it made—met the requirements to 
suspend or revoke his license for a year— 
THE COURT: Well, Ms. Waldron, what I want to hear 
from is—actually, that question was directed to Mr. Hamilton 
since I kind of anticipated that you'd be— 
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MS. WALDRON: Yes, (inaudible) your Honor— 
THE COURT: —(inaudible) this one— 
MR. HAMILTON: And that's—that's why I want the 
Court to read the United States Supreme Court case dealing 
with a similar issue, dealing with driver's licenses but a 
different type of issue. 
The issue in the case that's been presented which 
is Bell vs. Berson, is whether an individual who was in an 
accident that was uninsured is entitled to have a hearing 
before his license is suspended. In Georgia, they didn't 
have the opportunity to even have a hearing. 
It's not right on point, but it is persuasive in 
that the court held that where there is a due process 
violation such as this, when you take somebody's privilege or 
right that they have, they've got an interest in this 
driving, this driving privilege and when you take that away 
from the driving—by the Driver's License taking it away by 
having their agent, the officer, issue a form and violate my 
client's, not only the statute indicating what the officer 
must do on behalf of the Driver's License Division, but as a 
result of that, also violating his due process rights to not 
have these privileges taken away unilaterally without first 
having a hearing on that. 
THE COURT: Okay. But here's—here's the—the 
central question, as near as I can tell: Did the deprivation 
11 
of his—of his due process rights, in other words, the sus— 
unilateral suspension in violation of the statute, compromise 
the integrity of the ultimate hearing? 
MR. HAMILTON: Your Honor, we feel that--that that 
is moot, that doesn't matter because it was taken away 
without him ever having had the chance for the hearing. 
THE COURT: But just a second. 
MR. HAMILTON: I understand your question. I 
understand your question and I think at that point, what you 
and I think— 
THE COURT: We're (inaudible) past one another, 
though. 
MR. HAMILTON: No. But I—I agree that the Court 
is—what the Court sees as the issue is: No harm, no foul 
because he had the hearing and the Driver's License Division 
took it away based on the hearing. But the Driver's License 
Division, through this officer, in fact, took it away before 
the hearing. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, we're going to—we're going 
to come to that piece of the puzzle, but first, it would seem 
to me that you would have a stronger due process claim if 
there was a connection between the absence of driving 
privilege and what happened at the hearing itself. For 
example, inability to retain counsel or act—or this caused 
kind of undue influence, inability to gather evidence, 
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something that—that undercuts the legitimacy, the integrity 
of the hearing itself. 
MR. HAMILTON: I think what the Court is saying is 
if there had been some further prejudice against Mr. Miller, 
that the petitioner's argument would then be strengthened. 
THE COURT: If it would have affected the—the 
hearing. 
Now, let me see if I can—if I can probe a little 
bit what your point is. And let—first, let me see if I — 
make sure I understand it, and that is, for the purposes of 
argument, we'll spot you, Judge, the conclusion that the 
hearing, one, occurred and was—and two, was an appropriately 
conducted hearing. But that doesn't matter because there is 
an independent issue concerning the deprivation of his 
driving privileges in violation of, one, the statute; two, 
the Constitution. 
MR. HAMILTON: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. So, then that contention raises, 
among others, the following issue: And that is, first, what 
remedy do you seek? 
MR. HAMILTON: The remedy we seek is an order 
depriving the Driver's License Division the opportunity of 
taking away his license based on this answer. 
THE COURT: Because? 
MR. HAMILTON: Because his due process rights were 
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1 violated at the get-go. Just as in a criminal case, when 
2 your due process riqhts are violated, the evidence can't come 
3 in. And what we're asking for is, this due process right was 
4 violated because he was never afforded notice in a hearing 
5 before— 
6 THE COURT: Uh huh. All right. Mr. Ham— 
7 MR. HAMILTON: —driver's license revocation. 
8 THE COURT: What's the—what—what would be the 
9 result under the following facts? The officer gives Mr. 
10 Miller Exhibit 1, gets back to the station, looks it over, 
11 light goes on, Oh, my God, I've given him the wrong form, 
12 I've checked the wrong box. He then causes a corrected 
13 report to go to Mr. Miller. And for my hypothetical, let's 
14 say that that occurs three days later. 
15 Do you still win? He's been deprived of his right 
16 for three days, does that deprive the—the Driver's License 
17 Division of proceeding with the hearing? 
18 MR. HAMILTON: I think it should but that's not the 
19 facts before us and we're only here to decide what facts are 
20 before us. 
21 THE COURT: I understand, but the principle is to 
22 what degree must an individual's driving privileges be 
23 I unlawfully deprived before that deprivation eliminates the 
24 | opportunity of the Driver's License Division to revoke the 
25 |license pursuant to the statute? 
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MR. HAMILTON: Well, I—I would put to the Court 
that as soon as this individual leaves the custody of the 
officer and he leaves the custody of that officer who#s 
acting on behalf of the Driver's License Division without a 
valid driving privilege, which he entered into the custody of 
that actor, that state actor with, then there's been a 
violation of the statute and the statute is written to 
comport with due process, Constitutional due process 
requirements that if a state actor is going to take away the 
right or privilege of an individual citizen, they have to do 
it according to due process requirements; that is, they have 
to give notice and the right to a hearing previous to the 
driver's license suspension or revocation. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. Uh huh. Why can't I fashion 
an equitable remedy which penalizes the Driver's License 
Division for the, what turns out to be as a practical matter, 
a premature deprivation of Mr. Miller's driving privileges by 
ordering reinstatement of his driver—driving privileges 30 
days in advance of when it would otherwise be available? 
MR. HAMILTON: Well, your Honor, if he was without 
his driving privileges during which—during the time when he 
should not have been without them, he went all the way 
through, without having his driving privileges and the issue 
is not trying to fashion some kind of equitable remedy that 
penalizes the Driver's License Division, that's not what 
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we're interested in. What we're interested in is a remedy 
that puts Mr. Miller back in the position that he would have 
been, not just had the officer complied, but to show the 
Driver's License Division: You violate somebody's 
Constitutional due process rights and there will be no 
authority for you to take action against that person's 
privilege. 
And here's why, because if—and this is what the 
Driver's License Division is currently doing—if this 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 had never been served upon Mr. Miller, 
that would have been a violation of the same due process 
rights because he would never have had the notice of a 
hearing or right to a hearing under his due process 
Constitutional rights. 
When that happens, the Driver's License Division 
says, Well, okay, we are then precluded from taking action. 
And rightfully so. And here, we have the same type of due 
process violation, taking away the privilege before hearing. 
THE COURT: Well, but in the first instance, there 
is a complete deprivation of the right to notice and hearing. 
The arrestee has no knowledge that the arrestee has any 
opportunity to challenge the loss of license. 
In—in this case, at least there is a communication 
to the arrestee that the arrestee has a right to challenge 
the—the suspension of the license. 
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1 I MR. HAMILTON: Then I'd like to change my 
2 hypothetical. Let's assume, because the statute requires 
3 that the individual submit the request for a hearing within 
4 ten days of getting the ticket or the notice provided by the 
5 Driver's License Division. If the officer retained that 
6 citation and notice from the Driver's License Division, 
7 forgetting to serve it upon the individual and served him 
8 five days later, still providing ample time for Mr. Miller to 
9 then make his request within the ten-day period, there's 
10 still such a violation that the Driver's License Division 
11 would not take the driving privilege, 
12 THE COURT: But that goes to the point that I 
13 raised first and that is, are we talking about a violation 
14 that compromises the integrity of the hearing? And I agree 
15 with you that—that shortening the statutory notice period is 
16 a—a substantial violation because it does precisely that. 
17 It makes less likely the arrestee's opportunity or that he'll 
18 exercise the opportunity to request a hearing. Ten days is 
19 ten days. Ten days has been determined to be the reasonable 
20 time to request a hearing. 
21 And if there's a shortening of that period due to a 
22 lapse in the—in the—in law enforcement's procedure, in my 
23 opinion, that's something that compromises the right to a 
24 hearing, the integrity of the hearing. This— 
25 MR. HAMILTON: I feel that the Court is saying—I'm 
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sorry. 
THE COURT,: Oh. _Go ahead. I'm done. 
MR. HAMILTON: (Inaudible) 
THE COURT: You said you understood it. That's 
good enough for me so I'm going to— 
MR. HAMILTON: Okay. I understand what the Court 
is saying; however, the real issue is whether or not due 
process rights of the individual have been violated. That's 
all we need to look at. If there's been a due process 
violation, then the actor, the State, or a subsidiary 
thereof, is precluded from taking action. 
THE COURT: But we have examples, you know what 
really comes to mind is probably the biggest example I can 
think of, is Miranda, where the United States Supreme Court, 
when confronted with a, what it determined to be a huge 
pandemic problem involving due process, fashioned a remedy 
that really wasn't—well, that included possibilities of the 
death penalty in the sense of the exclusionary rule; but was 
clearly attempting, in my view, to kind of fashion a remedy 
consistent with the level of egregiousness of the violation 
of the Constitution. 
Why shouldn't I do that here? 
MR. HAMILTON: Because the United States Supreme 
Court in this case, even though the facts are different and 
if the Court will turn with me maybe— 
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THE COURT: Did I taring that case in with me or did 
I decide I was going to take a recess and read it out th^r^? 
THE CLERK: It should be in the file. 
THE COURT: It is. Okay. 
Mr. Hamilton, where do you want me to turn? 
MR. HAMILTON: Okay. My computer printed this up 
as Page 5. It's actually Page 539 of the opinion. 
THE COURT: Got it. 
MR. HAMILTON: At the very bottom, the last two 
sentences, it says: Suspension of issued licenses does 
involve state action that adjudicates important interests of 
the licensees. And that's what we're dealing with here. In 
such cases, the licenses are not to be taken away without 
that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
And then in turning a couple more pages to my Page 
7, Page 542 under the U.S. Reporter. Towards the bottom of 
that paragraph that indi—that starts with Key Note 7 or Head 
Note 7. 
THE COURT: Got it. 
MR. HAMILTON: Right where Foot Note 5 begins, in 
the—in the—in the paragraph. Due process requires that 
when a state seeks to terminate an interest such as that 
herein involved, and that was the driving privilege, it must 
afford notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the 
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nature of the case before the termination becomes effective, 
Here, he was given notice and right to a hearing, 
but that suspension or revocation became effective before he 
was provided the opportunity for the hearing. They got it 
backwards. And that's what happened here, they got it 
backwards, they took away the privilege, then gave the 
hearing. 
And the U.S. Supreme Court says no, such a 
privilege as this, someone's driving privilege, if you're 
going to take that away, State, first give them the hearing, 
then you can take it away. Not the other way around. 
And so we're saying that based on this case and Mr. 
Miller's due process rights that were here violated and I 
think that's pretty apparent, and there was a violation of 
the statute as well and the statute was drafted to afford due 
process rights under the Constitution. That's the reason it 
was drafted the way it was so that there would not be a 
suspension prior to the hearing. 
And in fact, Driver's License Division, if you want 
an extension of time for the hearing, if you want to continue 
it because your attorney or yourself is—has a conflict with 
that day, in order for you to get that extension, you have to 
waive your right in writing to have the hearing after they 
suspend. So, they'll take your license at the end of the 30 
days, if the hearing has been scheduled after the 30 days and 
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in order for them to even consider continuing it after that 
j 30-day period, when this Exhibit 1 is valid as a driver's 
license, you've got to waive that privilege in writing. 
And so even though the Driver's License Division in 
other instances is trying to comport with the statute and the 
requirements of due process, in this case, they didn't try to 
do that. Thereafter, the officer took away my client's due 
process rights by suspending or revoking his privileges 
before the hearing. And that's all it comes down to. 
Was there a violation of due process right? If 
there was, then there can be no action by the Driver's 
License Division. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. Well, Ms. Waldron, first, do 
you concede that—that there was an erroneous failure to 
provide Mr. Miller with a temporary license? 
MS. WALDRON: I do concede that. He should have 
been granted the—the temporary license (inaudible) yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, what to do? 
MS. WALDRON: Well, you know, in—in cases where 
the issue of civil rights is addressed or deprivation of 
property rights, whether it's—and I don't have any cases to 
cite, but when there's a post-deprivation hearing, when a 
person is granted a hearing after the right has been—an 
individual has been deprived of that right, there has been 
case law which has said that that is sufficient. 
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1 And whether—I know there's some with regard to 
2 inmates, when they've been deprived of property or whatever, 
3 and then after the fact, they've been given a post-
4 deprivation hearing. I believe that the courts have said 
5 that that's sufficient to cure the lack of a hearing prior to 
6 the deprivation. 
7 And as our argument here is because there was a 
8 hearing after the fact, there was technically a post-
9 deprivation hearing, even though that hearing dealt with— 
10 with respect to the Driver's License Division, the initial 
11 revocation, there was evidence presented, the hearing officer 
12 heard everything and at that time, determined that his 
13 license should be revoked. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. I'm spotting you the—that there 
15 was an appropriately conducted hearing; but we've still got 
16 an individual who was deprived of a privilege, a state-
17 granted privilege of considerable importance and 
18 significance. No one—no one is going to seriously debate 
19 the importance of driving privileges; after all, that's why 
20 the deprivation of that for driving while intoxicated is a 
21 serious piece of business. Not only does it protect the 
22 citizens from impaired drivers on the road but the driving 
23 I privilege is something of considerable value to all of. us. 
24 | And so what we've got is Mr. Miller, who has been 
25 | wrongfully deprived of something that is important for 30 
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1 I days, 
2 j - And so, really, what we're talking about here is,— 
3 is one, does it matter? And I—I hear you telling me, well, 
4 Judge, it doesn't matter, which isn't—that's a loser. I 
5 mean, I— 
6 MS. WALDRON: Well, no, it's not that it doesn't 
7 matter. It's just that if there was no hearing at all, I 
8 think we'd be in real trouble; but the fact that there was a 
9 post-deprivation hearing, so there was a hearing, and—at 
10 which time his license was revoked, I think we're looking at 
11 the remedy. I mean, there was that 30 days— 
12 THE COURT: We are—exactly— 
13 MS. WALDRON: —we're looking at the remedy here. 
14 THE COURT: And so I'm—I'm inviting— 
15 MS. WALDRON: And— 
16 I THE COURT: —you to suggest a remedy for— 
17 MS. WALDRON: Well— 
18 THE COURT: —me. 
19 MS. WALDRON: — I think the most logical remedy 
20 from the respondent's point of view is, to whatever days his 
21 license was suspended prior to the initial hearing be 
22 deducted from the year. So, it would be a total of a year 
23 I from the ini—would be from the date of arrest. 
24 | THE COURT: From the date of arrest rather than— 
25 I MS. WALDRON: From the date of the arrest for a 
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year. And that would be the—the respondent's feeling of 
appropriate remedy, whereas, because it was—li y^ a look at 
the case law and I think the post-deprivation hearing cures 
any due process violation, but you have the—you have to look 
at that 30 days and factor that in to whatever the revocation 
is. 
MR. HAMILTON: May I respond, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yeah. Please do. 
MR. HAMILTON: On—on the bottom of that Page 5 
that I referred to, referred you to earlier, just as this 
Court has indicated, it's an important interest, this driving 
privilege. And as it says, suspension of issued licenses 
thus involves state action and adjudicates important 
interests of the licensees. 
And it goes on to say, In such cases—and that is 
the suspension of an individual's license—the licensee's 
are—the licenses are not to be taken away without that 
procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Here, there was a violation of the procedural due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, it was violated and 
therefore, this individual's license is not to be taken away. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. HAMILTON: His privilege is not to be taken 
away. I don't know what cases Counsel's talking about of 
post-deprivation, a post-deprivation hearing. Clearly, 
24 
they're not dealing with driver's license which the U.S. 
Supreme Court has already said, hey, this is an important 
interest, this driving privilege. If you're going to take 
that away, you can't take it away unless you comply with the 
Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements. 
And here, the State has already admitted that they 
did not comply with that; therefore, they are precluded or— 
or this Court is precluded to—from fashioning some other 
remedy, other than outright granting of the petitioner's 
petition. 
THE COURT: Is there any indication that—that this 
event was anything other than a (sic) isolated oversight on 
the part of one officer? 
MR. HAMILTON: I have seen it happen on one other 
occasion and my client on that occasion did not wish to 
appeal; but I think the Driver's License Division needs to be 
aware that this is the same type of due process violation as 
is service of process. It's the same type, so that they're 
not—so that when these isolated instances, when officers are 
less than adequately trained, when they do this, the Driver's 
License Division should be notified to that. This one person 
doesn't get his license taken away. If you comply with the 
procedural due process requirements, yeah, then yeah, at a 
hearing, you can take it away; but if you don't, you don't 
get to. 
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1 It's not happening very often. I do a lot cf DUIs 
2 as this Court's probably already aware and I_see one every 
3 two years, maybe. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. 
5 MS. WALDRON: Your Honor? 
6 THE COURT: Ms. Waldron? 
7 MS. WALDRON: Just one brief thing. With respect 
8 to this case, Bell vs. Berson, it's my understanding—and I 
9 haven't read the whole thing, that no hearing was afforded at 
10 all in this case. 
11 THE COURT: Correct. 
12 MS. WALDRON: Is that correct? 
13 THE COURT: That's right. 
14 MR. HAMILTON: That is right. 
15 MS. WALDRON: And I think that is a really big 
16 distinguishing factor. You know, if no hearing was afforded, 
17 yeah, I think it would be a due process problem; but we did 
18 afford a hearing, and so that would distinguish our case 
19 extremely from Bell vs. Berson. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 MR. HAMILTON: Except that referring to the latter 
22 part that I cited to earlier, Notice and opportunity for 
23 J hearing appropriate to the nature of the case before the 
24 | termination becomes effective. This termination of driving 
25 | privileges became effective before the hearing. And so the 
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1 language in the case is sufficient to say, this is an 
2 j important enough privilege or right rjidt we're__not- going to 
3 let you take away their license if you try to take it away 
4 before the hearing. 
5 THE COURT: It's an interesting problem and one 
6 which, in my view, merits the following result: 
7 First of all, I find that there has been a—a 
8 deprivation of Mr. Miller's statutory right and his right to 
9 due process by reason of the failure to provide Mr. Miller 
10 with a temporary license, as mandated under the statute. 
11 I next find that Mr. Miller was advised of his 
12 right to a hearing to challenge the propriety of the 
13 deprivation of his driving privileges, that he exercised that 
14 right, that his driving privileges were in fact revoked for a 
15 period of one year pursuant to a hearing, and that the 
16 integrity of the hearing wasn't compromised by reason of the 
17 unlawful suspension of his driving privileges for the period 
18 of time between arrest and the hearing. 
19 Next, it's rele—it's relevant, in my view, that 
20 the nature of the deprivation here is not a systemic problem 
21 in law enforcement or within the Driver's License Division 
22 but is one which occurs from time to time. As law 
23 I enforcement officers share with judges the—the flaw of being 
24 | fallible from time to time, probably law enforcement less 
25 | than judges. 
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My task is to fashion an appropriate remedy and I— 
in my view, -I have considerable discretion in fashionir^ a 
remedy to a due process violation. 
Mr. Hamilton has drawn my attention to the case of 
Bell vs. Berson and I commend Mr. Hamilton for his typically 
thorough research into these—into these matters. The Bell 
vs. Berson case has been argued for two principles. Mr. 
Hamilton argues the language in the lead opinion, might even 
be the unanimous opinion, for the proposition that there must 
be notice and hearing before there can be a deprivation of a 
property interest or any other Constitutionally protected 
interest.-
Ms. Waldron urges that I bear in mind that there 
are important distinguishing characteristics between Bell vs. 
Berson, to-wit that the driving force in Bell vs. Berson was 
that there was no provision for any notice of hearing in 
Georgia prior to the deprivation of driving privileges for 
failure to provide evidence of insurance. 
I think the—that Ms. Waldron's analysis of—of 
what's going on in Bell vs. Berson is more relevant to—to 
this setting and that the precise question presented in this 
case, and that is, in a case where there is—there has been 
notice and hearing but there has also been a pre-notice and 
hearing deprivation or pre-hearing deprivation of rights, 
does that deprive the governmental entity of any further 
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1 this point to modify its holding and make it appropriate for 
2 the individual as opposed to the community, because that's 
3 not why we're here, 
4 THE COURT: Yeah. Although not articulated, I—I 
5 had taken actually what you said into account and I'm going 
6 to stand by what I did. 
7 MR. HAMILTON: Thank you, your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: And thank you, folks. It's aLways a 
9 pleasure to see you. 
10 MS. WALDRON: Your Honor, would you like me to 
11 prepare the appropriate order and—and— 
12 THE COURT: That—that would be great. 
13 MS. WALDRON: —show it to counsel? 
14 THE COURT: Since, for the most part, you've been 
15 able to just kind of sit here and observe this morning. 
16 We'll give you something substantive to do. 
17 MR. HAMILTON: Your Honor, could we ask for a—an 
18 order staying— 
19 THE COURT: So you can appeal? 
20 MR. HAMILTON: —so we can appeal? 
21 THE COURT: Have you got a problem with that? 
22 MR. HAMILTON: I think it's an interesting enough 
23 issue that— 
24 I THE COURT: Yeah, I think it's a fascinating issue, 
25 I MS. WALDRON: I think it's a fascinating issue, 
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I ' l l a g r e e . 
^HF "vvTprn. yeah* And I ' l l g r a n t i t . _ 
MR. HAM J L.TON : Thank y u m xionor. 
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